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 ABSTRACT 
This paper demonstrates how adoption of High Reliability Organization Theory 
(HROT) delivers value to mainstream organizations.  It presents the terminology that 
encompasses High Reliability Organizations (HROs) and how researchers define the 
characteristics and core principles of such organizations.  These organizations have been 
well studied by professionals from numerous disciplines allowing us to understand what 
makes an HRO successful.  This paper will add to this by exploring how HROT may be 
applied to mainstream organizations and elaborates on the importance of mindfulness 
specifically as it relates to sensitivity to operations.  The findings are synthesized into an 
actual project that successfully leveraged HROT principles to improve reliability and 
address operational risk.  The paper concludes that there are considerable opportunities to 
exploit HROT in project, program, and process management to achieve high reliability 
and value in a non-HRO. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
Personal background 
It is said that history repeats itself, but we most often don’t recognize it happening 
until after it unfolds again.  In a personal reflection on the irreversibility of life and death, 
Viktor E. Frankl, in his book the Meaning of Life, shares his personal imperative “Live as 
if you were living for the second time and have acted wrongly the first time as you are 
about to act now”.1
One must ask, is it necessary to bring an elephant into the room when your issues 
compare to a mouse in scale.  When thinking back to my boyhood cartoons, the little 
mouse had the candid ability to create havoc by startling the larger creatures.  Managing 
for these little creatures is an analogy for the underlying theme within High Reliability 
Organization Theory (HROT).  The basic premise behind HROT is that organizations 
  The essence of this quote is behavior guided by a sense of 
mindfulness.  Its context is deepened once we understand its author is a miraculous 
survivor of German Nazi concentration and extermination camps.  We all face our own 
degree of tragedy in life, personal and public, where even though the scale may be at the 
opposite extremes of what Viktor Frankl faced, we can learn from the wisdom of those 
who have survived travesties to find what resources they tapped in order to fuel resilient 
motivation and inspirations in our own lives.   Similarly, this paper will investigate how a 
knowledge area developed through diagnosis of the worst accidents may help us address 
the challenges in our own organizations.  
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need to be attentive to weak signals, and once identified, to address them with a strong 
response.  Often, this is counter intuitive to how we normally behave. 
The strength of High Reliability research is also a source of weakness.  Its 
strength is the contribution by leading researchers from various disciplines, either 
collaborating or working independently to analyze and diagnose tragic or near tragic 
events to determine their underlying causes.  Through this research, knowledge is gained 
that may be used to prevent a similar recurrence.  Examples of such studies include the 
Three Mile Island accident, Challenger launch disaster, Bhopal gas tragedy, airline 
accidents, and the operational performance aboard an aircraft carrier.  Its weakness is that 
the studies are conducted utilizing a relatively narrow cohort study that challenges its 
credibility in normal operations.  Another limiting factor is that by design it’s a 
retrospective diagnosis, offering little in terms on how to put a High Reliability 
Organization in place.  In order to take advantage of HROT, one needs to incorporate 
these findings into an application framework to gain value.  This may be in formalized 
project management such as The Project Management Institute’s project guidelines, 
Program Management, Six Sigma, and other Quality and process improvement 
methodologies. 
Are not these frameworks adequate?  Why would you introduce additional theory 
to complicate the project?  The justification is that many projects fall short or fail to 
deliver against their original expectations.  
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Project results 
When comparing my professional experience with the success of projects defined 
in the Standish Group Report (2010), my experience is similar to the findings in the 
Literature Review.  According to Erling S. Andersen’s study in the Project Management 
Journal, (2010), “The most well-known quantitative studies of project success are the 
Standish Group Reports.” 2  While the report is specific to Information Technology (IT) 
projects, it’s generally viewed as a reasonable benchmark across other areas.  Their 
research results are summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1. Project Success Rates 
Project Result 2000 2006 2008 
Succeeded:   ( % ) 
(delivered on time, on budget, with required 
features and functions) 28 35 32 
Failed:   ( % ) 
(cancelled prior to completion or delivered and 
never used) 23 19 24 
Challenged:   (% ) 
(late, over budget, and/or with less than the 
required features and functions) 49 46 44 
 
There has been an increase in the percent of “Succeeded” outcomes between 2000 
and 2008 and a decline in the “Challenged” percentage.  Despite these positive indicators, 
the findings still reflect almost one in four projects “Failed” with less than one third of 
projects “Succeeded”.  Given projects are susceptible to economic conditions; the 
declining economy during 2006 to 2008 may explain the increase in cancelled projects 
and the drop in those that “Succeeded”.  While this table furnishes valuable information, 
the limited amount of data and the date range makes it difficult to perform statistical 
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trend analysis.  An important output of Erling S. Andersen’s research is that it identifies 
improvement opportunity through improved decision processes, better management and 
leadership, and closer cooperation with the stakeholders.3  The Literature Review 
suggests these attributes are found in High Reliability Organizations (HROs) and will be 
covered in Chapter 3. 
Purpose of this capstone  
The purpose of this Capstone is to determine if incorporating High Reliability 
Organization Theory (HROT) – specifically mindfulness of the unexpected through 
sensitivity to operations- into project and operational risk management may improve the 
success in fulfilling the project’s goals.  The impetus of this paper is to discover an 
alternative body of knowledge that may be used to address operational risks, within a 
project directive, that supports the program’s strategic goals and objectives.   
The methodology taken was to conduct extensive research on HROs and the 
discipline areas that contribute to the various facets of HROT.  The paper will utilize an 
actual process improvement and Information Technology (IT) project to demonstrate 
HROT and the related findings of the research.  This will be presented in Chapter 4.  
Based on the findings of the research, this capstone will draw a recommendation and 
conclusion.  
Chapter 1 provides personal background and description of upcoming chapters 
utilizing analogy to emphasize the value of learning from an emerging research area and 
applying it into mainstream projects. 
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Chapter 2 furnishes the literature review of this subject area.  This study will 
incorporate research from various professional areas, with most of it derived from clinical 
field study of disasters or near disasters.  The availability of diversified disciplines brings 
a breadth of knowledge and perspectives into a single domain area.  The strength and 
weakness of the applicable disciplines as they apply to this paper will also be presented. 
Chapter 3 explores how the study of High Reliability Organizations (HROs) 
evolved into High Reliability Organizational Theory (HROT) and its usefulness in 
managing operational risks and achieving project deliverables.   HROs are defined with 
explaining how expectations impact our sense of Mindfulness against five success 
factors.  The characteristics of Sensitivity to Operations are demonstrated through use of 
the Swiss Cheese Model. The counter intuitive concept of making a strong response to a 
weak signal is explained as well as how tight coupling impacts implementation. 
Chapter 4 uses a recently implemented project to evaluate the viability of HROT 
in a mainstream organization.  The project delivered a streamlined paperless dispatch 
process integrating risk management and High Reliability Organization principles. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the findings.  Recommended further research and 
application will also be presented. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Inter-discipline theory 
Research comes together from various disciplines to contribute to HROT 
establishing it as a formidable model.  The initial research may be traced back to 
the High Reliability Organizations Project at the University of California at 
Berkeley.  This research followed the publication of Perrow’s Normal Accidents 
in 1984 by two or three years.  The pioneers include Todd La Porte, a Professor of 
Political Science, Gene Rocklin, originally a scholar in Physics, and Karlene 
Roberts, a Professor of Organization Behavior.4  The emerging research can be 
found from such diverse areas such as Management, Sociology, Political Science, 
Anthropology, and Psychology.  Each discipline furnishes a different lens of 
interpretation and insight fostering a greater breadth of understanding.  Table 2 
summarizes some of the leading research into this domain.   
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Table 2. High Reliability Organization Discipline Areas (adapted from van 
Stralen, 2012. High Reliability Organizing web site)  5 
 
Neuropsychology 
The findings in neuropsychology research studying the cognitive activity 
of the different areas of the brain of HRO individuals have revealed that their 
behavior is commensurate with one another.  Determining what part of the brain’s 
hemisphere is being used allows for a neurological assessment to understand both 
reasoning and behavior.  Neuropsychology, according to the National Academy of 
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Neuropsychology, is a professional field of study of psychology with applied 
science of brain-behavior relationships.6   
According to research advanced by van Stralen (2012), 
“The individual functions through neuroanatomy, reasoning, and attitudes. 
The prefrontal cortex, producing the brain’s executive functions, makes 
binary decisions (right/wrong), abstract thought including the future, and 
planning.  Here, perception goes to thought goes to action. The amygdala, 
a more primitive region sometimes called the reptilian brain, is the 
survival brain where perception goes to action without thought. This is 
where fight-flight-freeze resides.  But the High Reliability person works in 
the cingulate cortex where the amygdala is modulated, error is identified, 
and adaptive decisions are made to find what works”. 7  
Charles Pumilia (personal communication) notes that the amygdala is 
where fear is processed in the brain.  The frontal lobes usually mediate the fear 
impulses, but this is not always a precise process – especially when stress, danger 
signals and other threats are evident.  The frontal lobes are also called in to 
mediate against anger, rage, jealousy and competition.  This is where human 
error, the subjective process that takes over and begins to affect how people think, 
react and how they interpret what is going on around them.  This is where 
leadership and execution of process can easily break down.8 
Van Stralen (2012) argues, 
The High Reliability individual uses inductive reasoning, increasing the 
strength of evidence to increase the strength of the conclusion. As these 
strengths vary, evidence is added or dropped and conclusions change in an 
active dynamic during engagement. Deductive reasoning, where facts 
(100% known) guarantee the hypothesis, is a luxury not available to the 
individual until long after events resolve and data can be evaluated.9 
   Understanding the cognitive makeup of individuals, helps construct teams 
who complement each other on how they think and behave.  Theoretically this 
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will improve the teams’ situational awareness and decision making.  Use of 
similar psychological tests such as DISC, (an acronym for Dominance, Influence, 
Steadiness, Compliance), or Myers-Briggs may yield benefit to organizations. 
Sociology: Normal Accidents 
As a leading advocate within this discipline, Charles Perrow through his 
book Normal Accidents (1984) and his later research on the Three Mile Island 
nuclear power plant accident offers a sociological perspective.  His coinage of the 
term normal accidents was further developed into Normal Accident Theory which 
delves into how people interact with complex technological systems to create 
whole or unitary systems.  His work examines interactive complexity and 
coupling of components within complex organizations. The complexity and 
coupling, whether by design or happenstance, determine the system’s 
susceptibility to accidents and make accidents not only inevitable but normal.10 
Roberts (1990) notes that,  
Generally, Perrow focuses on what he calls complexity and tight coupling.  
By complex interactions, Perrow means interactions of unfamiliar 
sequences, and either not visible or not immediately comprehensible.” 
Complexity’s elements are the potential for unexpected sequence of 
activities, complex technologies, subsystems called upon to serve multiple 
(and incompatible) functions, proximity, indirect information sources, and 
baffling interactions.11    
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Accidents then derive not so much from human cognition and behaviors or 
by engineered designs but from dynamic human-machine interactions. 
While these accidents may be predicted and the risk accepted or identified 
in hindsight from missed data they may also result from information that is 
undiscoverable until events unfold.  In effect, the surprise reflects not what 
is cognitively missed but what is cognitively absent.12 
Counter argument 
 HROs research is based on a narrow cohort that may jeopardize the 
credibility of the study.  The research is developed from high profile accidents, 
medical trauma centers, or processes that if they failed- the result would be 
catastrophic harm.  These may not be applicable to mainstream projects and 
programs.  For example, there may be little similarity in how nuclear plants, 
aircraft carriers, and forest fire fighters are organized, perform their recruitment 
and hiring, fund their budgets, and train their staff.  These are only a few of the 
multitude of differentiating variables between HROs and most organizations.  
This questions the applicability of HROT into mainstream projects.  
Post mortem clinical studies are also subject to ‘hindsight bias’, by starting 
at an outcome and reverse mapping to pre-existing latent conditions, that may 
have been altered since the event transpired.  The existing research is so heavily 
retrospectively skewed that it challenges the notion of prospective application.  
This study revealed that all processes need to be evaluated independently as no 
cook book type methodology is available. 
11 
 
Another restraining factor is that it may be easily construed that HRO s 
theory is inversely correlated and tightly coupled to efficiency.  The level of due 
diligence conducted in a HRO are exponentially higher than what may be viable 
for most mainstream organizations to implement into their processes.  
Exasperated by the economic duress over the last few years, existing 
organizations are running lean and are extremely productivity oriented.  Most 
main stream organizations and their projects must prioritize what they can do, 
accepting the fact that the smaller less important things may never get done.   
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CHAPTER 3 
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS AS AN EMERGING THEORY  
Based on the literature review, even though there is a tremendous learning 
opportunity from studying HROs, these outputs are not directly recognized in the 
leading body of knowledge publications in project management, business 
analysis, and business process management.  This chapter integrates this emerging 
area into the project management context so the reader and the project community 
can better understand how they are associated to each other and the value 
proposition in bringing the two together.  
Iron triangle 
Linear based project management is bounded by what is referred to as the Iron 
Triangle.  Time, Scope, and Budget represent each side of a triangle.  Quality is generally 
represented as the inner dimension.  These are interdependent variables, for changes 
occurring in one impacts at least one of the others.  Increasing scope extends time and or 
increases cost, for a change in one impacts at least one other.  Using a software 
development example, change management may create havoc on a project plan and 
schedule.  Introducing a late business requirement such as developing new functionality 
(scope expansion) that was not configured into the original plan, may require additional 
assets to work on it, resulting in higher cost, or more time. There are countless scenarios 
that require managing tradeoffs among these and other constraints.  The Project 
Management Institute (PMI®) in its, A Guide to the Project Management Body of 
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Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide-4th Edition) (2008) establishes that other primary project 
constraints include, but are not limited to, resources and risks.13  
Innovative approaches may alter the relationships, but the elements remain as 
constraints to various degrees.  For example, the growing popularity of Agile 
methodology results in short fuse development and implementation within short interval 
cycle times.  The Institutional Institute of Business Analysis (2011) explains, 
Agile is a term used to describe a number of iterative development methodologies 
that have developed over time.  Common traits amongst agile methodologies 
include frequent product releases, high levels of real-time collaboration with the 
project team and with customers, reduced time intensive documentation, and 
regular assessments of value and risk to allow for change.14   
 The Agile development phases are time boxed to fixed time parameters that 
emphasize delivering value to the customer in short time period release sprints so they 
deliver benefits to the customer as early as possible. 
 Regardless of the methodology deployed or implementation of a project or 
program framework, all organizations operate under constraints where they need to 
understand and manage tradeoffs.  Once the team manages through these difficult 
situations, for the project to reach its strategic program’s goals, these decisions need to 
ensure both continuity and sustainability post implementation to realize long-term 
benefit.   Presented later in this chapter, the section on process coupling will identify 
pairing characteristics among key elements to better understand important inter-
relationships and assist in the evaluation of specific tradeoffs.  Paradoxically by 
introducing HROT it may jeopardize the Iron Triangle components by increasing time, 
scope, and budget without necessarily adding perceived value.  Under General 
Accounting Practices, cost savings for events or issues avoided or effectively mitigated 
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are not normally recognized.  Unless special calculations are performed, an organization 
may not have the visibility and means to judge the true value, resulting in an unfavorable 
perception.  
There are two dimensions within the project management process: technical and 
socio-cultural.  The technical side consists of the formal, disciplined, purely logical parts 
of the process.15 The technical side represents the mechanics of planning, scheduling, and 
control.  It is reliant on information systems to manage scope, cost, time, and the quality 
progress as identified above in the Iron Triangle of project management.  It may also be 
referred to as the ‘science’ side of process management, as it integrates all the 
information in a quantitative form for management and decision making.   
Figure 1.  The Technical and Socio-Cultural Dimensions of the Project 
Management process (adapted from Gray and Larson. 2002. Project Management-The 
Complete Guide for Every Manager)16 
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 The socio-cultural dimension addresses development of the social system to 
combine the talents of a divergent set of professionals working to complete the project.  
Gray and Larson (2002) report, “Project managers must shape a project culture that 
stimulates teamwork and high levels of personal motivation as well as a capacity to 
quickly identify and resolve problems that threaten project work.”17  This dimension is 
represented as the art of project management.  Balanced attention to both aspects is 
required and equally critical.  
Figure 1 is presented in a Yin Yang symbol demonstrating that these variables are 
both interconnecting and interdependent.  They have the ability to build off and reinforce 
each other or operate as polar opposites causing conflict and disruption.  This capstone 
postulates that HROT offers value in improving project, program, and portfolio 
performance by positively bridging these two dimensions together. 
 An organization’s capability to integrate these components may be impacted by 
its maturity.  Gray and Larson (2002) note that Carnegie Mellon University’s Capability 
Maturity Model (CMM) was developed in December 1984 to initially address the well 
recognized need for improved software in the U.S. Department of Defense.  Originally, 
the CMM serves as a guide for organizations on implementing best practices of managing 
software development projects.18   Through iterative progression, CMMs expanded into 
improving processes within an organization.  The university report argues, “They contain 
the essential elements of effective processes for one or more disciplines and described an 
evolutionary improvement path from ad hoc, immature process to discipline mature 
processes with improved quality and effectiveness.”19  The CMM models have iteratively 
progressed to what is now referred to as CMM Integration (CMMI).  Its latest version is 
16 
 
CMMI v1.3 published in 2010.   CMMI’s current version delineates five stages of 
maturity.  They advance sequentially through five sequential levels:  Initial, Managed, 
Defined, Quantitatively Managed, and Optimizing 20 
Per Gray and Lawson (2002), “Our best guest estimate is that most companies are in 
the throes of moving from level two to level three and that less than 10 percent of those 
firms that actively practice project management are at level four or five.”21  Prospective 
adoption of HRO’s sense of Mindfulness and its sub components, as presented later in 
this chapter, may be an excellent enabler as well as an accelerator to raise the maturity 
level within an organization.  
 Alternatively, the Project Management Institute (PMI) has developed their 
Organizational Project Maturity Model (OPM3)-Second Edition (2008) that seeks to 
improve an organization’s competencies and outcomes through development of Best 
Practices.   Specifically,  
The Organizational Project Management Maturity Model (OPM3®) is a 
framework that provides an organization-wide view of portfolio management, 
program management, and project management to support achieving Best 
Practices within each of these domains.  This holistic perspective is a powerful 
tool enabling successful execution of organizational strategies, portfolios, 
programs, and projects, especially when these transcend functional and hierarchal 
boundaries.  Moreover, OPM3 Global Best Practices, applied to the execution of 
strategy, can drive superior and sustainable results.22 
 
PMI in the OPM3®-Second Edition guide breaks their Best Practices down into 
two major categories.  The first is Process Improvement through four stages: Standardize, 
Measure, Control, and Improve (SMCI); the second category is Organizational Enablers 
(OE).  Maturity is attained through sequential development of SMCI within each of its 
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elements.  The Improvement stage is dependent on Control, Control on Measure, and 
Measure on Standardize.    
PMI’s second Best Practices category is ‘Organizational Enablers’ (OE).  These 
are the structural, cultural, technological, and human-resource practices that can be 
leveraged to support and sustain the implementation of Best Practices in projects, 
programs, and portfolios.23    PMI recognizes the value of supporting training, 
methodologies, tools, and techniques that are not explicitly defined in the PMI published 
standards with considering them within the domain of organizational project 
management.24   Examples of pre-defined Organizational Enablers include: Competency 
Management, Sponsorship, Individual Performance Appraisal, Process Success Criteria 
and Organizational Project Management Practices, Processes, and Techniques.  Based on 
the literature review, HROT is a natural fit as a Best Practice Organizational Enabler.   
According to Hillson (2004), “the goal for the risk-aware organization is to be 
able to modify its risk attitude appropriately given the changing environment in which it 
operates.  This requires a flexible corporate risk culture that is neither always anxiously 
risk-averse nor unflinchingly risk-seeking, but can be described as “risk mature.” 25  
Frameworks enable an organization to assess themselves against benchmarks to 
determine their strengths and weaknesses.  They also furnish a structured guideline or 
road map toward achieving higher competency and effectiveness.    One such model is 
the Risk Maturity Model (RMM).  As described by Hilson (2004),  
RMM was developed to meet the needs of organizations wishing to compare their 
management of risk with best practice or against competitors using an accepted 
benchmark for organizational risk capability.  Development of the RMM drew on 
established concepts from existing models such as the Capability Maturity Model 
(CMM) from Carnegie-Mellon Software Engineering Institute and the European 
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Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) Business Excellence Model.  The 
RMM describes four levels of increasing risk management capability, termed 
Naïve, Novice, Normalized, and Natural. The aim is to provide a structured route 
to excellence in risk management, with recognizable strategies along the way that 
organizations can use to benchmark themselves against.  Each RMM level is 
further defined in terms of four attributes, namely culture, process, experience, 
and application.  These allow an organization to assess its current approach to risk 
management against agreed criteria, set realistic targets for improvement, and 
measure process toward enhanced risk capability.26  
 
Development of HROT as an input into an applicable framework must warrant its 
effort against the project’s Iron Triangle of Time, Cost, Scope and Quality.  Risk 
management must be backed by strong organizational commitment within a supportive 
culture.  Hillson (2004) states: “Culture can be defined as the total of the shared beliefs, 
values, and knowledge of a group of people with a common purpose.  It therefore has 
both an individual and a corporate component.  For risk management to be effective, the 
culture must be supportive.  This means that the risk attitudes of individuals must be 
understood and managed, and the organization’s overall approach to risk must be 
mature.” 27 Prior to elaborating further on this proposition, a baseline understanding of 
Program and Project Risk as they are associated to HRO’s will now be compared.  
Definition of risk 
The triadic framework presented in Figure 2 identifies Program risk at the apex of 
the triangle.  Program risk maturity is dependent on the project risk management 
processes, which is shown as the center or core of the triangle.   The foundation or lower 
level of the triangle represents the operational risks inherent to the processes developed 
within each project.  Operational risks are attributed to the tactical decisions and 
transactions that are continuously or routinely performed.  Based on literature review, 
HROs are successful at picking up weak signals and apply strong responses to them.  
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This enables the problem to be addressed while it is still controllable and manageable.   
Effectively leveraging HROT at the earliest detection or origination point of the signals 
delivers the best bang for the buck.  This enables the organization to construct and 
execute an action plan, either through escalated monitoring of the situation or 
implementing a prompt strong risk response.   Chapter 4’s Astro Project study established 
pre-defined trigger points and criteria based on various scenarios to serve as a decision 
aid for escalation and response management. 
Figure 2. Triadic View of Program, Project, and Operational Risk 
 
 
The literature review on CMMI states that there is variability in the amount of 
time it take organizations to move from one maturity level to the next using CMM.  Level 
1 to 2 takes 19 months, level 2 to 3 takes 20 months, level 3 to 4 takes 25 months, and 
level 4 to 5 takes 13 months.  The entire journey if consistently pursued would take six 
and a half years.28  Adoption of HROT at the operational level advances the 
organization’s risk competency resulting in a high quality input into the project risk 
 
Program 
Project Risk 
Operational Risk 
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management plan.  This further elevates into the program’s knowledge and awareness 
enabling greater organizational maturity.   Previously identified as a best practice 
organizational enabler, HROT may also be construed as a risk maturity accelerator.   
In the United Kingdom’s Office of Government Commerce (OGC), Managing 
Successful Programmes (2007) guide, risk is defined as “An uncertain event or set of 
events which, should it occur, will have an effect on the achievement of objectives; a risk 
is measured by a combination of the probability of a perceived threat or opportunity 
occurring and magnitude of its impact on objectives.”29   The guideline’s risk 
management process consists of four steps: Identify, Assess, Plan, and Implement.  
Within its principles it promotes establishing early-warning indicators based on 
predefined criteria to proactively trigger corrective action.  Beyond this, there is little 
discernible evidence that compliance to the framework adequately prepares an 
organization for the unexpected.  It is heavily geared toward prioritization, roles, and 
responsibilities. 
 Similarly, The Project Management Institute in its, A Guide to the Project 
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide-4th Edition) (2008) defines risk as “an 
uncertain event or condition that, if it occurs, has a positive or negative effect on a 
project’s objectives.”30    Its principles are comprised of six Project Risk Management 
processes: 
• Plan Risk Management 
• Identify Risks 
• Perform Qualitative Risk Analysis 
• Perform Quantitative Risk Analysis 
• Plan Risk Responses 
• Monitor and Control Risks  31  
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Cross-referencing this to the Table 1 Project Success Rates in Chapter 1, the need 
for improvements within this area is validated by the actions of the Project Management 
Institute (PMI®).  In 2009, PMI supplemented the use of tool, technique, or process 
identified in the PMBOK® Guide through publishing a dedicated guideline to risk project 
management.  PMI followed with developing qualifications standards and establishing 
the Project Management Institute-Risk Management Professional (PMI-RMP) 
certification.  While this is a major step forward in risk management, it has scope 
limitations as described in Practice Standard for Project Risk Management (2009). 
The Practice Standard for Project Risk Management covers risk management as 
it is applied to single projects only.  Like the PMBOK® Guide-Fourth Edition, this 
practice standard does not cover risk in programs or portfolios of projects. 32  
 
Use of the aforementioned standard provides a narrow orientation of risk within a 
single project that limits the ability of an organization to both manage systemic risk and 
proactively identify unexpected risk.  It also introduces confounding by simplifying the 
concerns to within a project or functional areas in isolation.  Failure to systemically 
evaluate the full realm of the impact exposes the organization to sub-optimizing the 
holistic end to end process; or potentially exposing it to secondary risk materialized from 
an ill conceived initial risk response. 
Development of practices that address both the technical and socio-cultural 
aspects - identified in Figure 2- with taking a process oriented approach offers an 
effective prescription for managing risk.  One technique to accomplish this is to routinely 
evaluate how things are operating, extending beyond the hard milestone check list of 
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scheduled deliverables, and flush out the organizational dynamic issues that may thwart 
improvement, hinder risk management, or otherwise sub-optimize performance. 
Project lessons learned 
Lesson learned offer the potential to advance an organization’s knowledge 
and awareness.  Often this is under exploited in practice.  The Project 
Management Institute (2008) defines a project as a “temporary endeavor 
undertaken to create a unique product, service or result. The temporary nature 
indicates a definitive start and end.”33   According to the statistics presented in 
Table 1, of projects reported, almost 1 in 4 projects terminated prematurely.  
Regardless of success or failure, lesson learned audits are frequently viewed as 
expendable exercises and if performed, have limited distribution and circulation 
of the findings.  Lack of a lesson learned knowledge repository limits others from 
benefitting from experience, especially in viral and in distributed team settings, 
holding back the maturity potential of the organization.  
One trap in project risk management is simply that it is associated to a single 
project. Once the project is launched and implemented, the risk register and the 
internalized concerns of the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) or stakeholders goes into a 
closed book.  Keith Hornbacher argues for an enterprise view of managing project risk 
and prefers using the phrase “cradle to cradle” rather than “cradle to grave” when 
describing a project.  That is, projects are tactical steps toward achieving a larger strategic 
purpose.  They are part of a whole-perhaps a program, portfolio, and the like.34  
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Due to pressures facing a typical project, Risks are generally prioritized toward 
Critical and Highs, or lists of the top 10.  Potentially the cumulative impacts of the small 
and medium risks are equally significant or greater than any of the top risks.  Risks that 
are identified but do not experience a known consequence, may become normalized 
resulting in a down grade of its risk assessment. This latent risk may be ignored resulting 
in an unexpected failure at a greater level of magnitude. As risks become artifacts of the 
project, and once the project ends, so does the visibility of previously identified risks.  
This would apply to both negative and positive risk which represents lost opportunity. 
In Nassim Taleb’s (2007) bestseller The Black Swan, he points out that “We learn 
from repetition-at the expense of events that have not happened before.  Events that are 
non-repeatable are ignored before their occurrence, and overestimated after (for a 
while).”35   The author offers to us that we need to maintain a heightened sense of 
awareness, in a similar form of mindfulness of the unexpected, to anticipate exposure to 
an unfavorable circumstance.  Based on human nature, we are susceptible to the heuristic 
of a recent event, where it is over weighted for a short period of time before our attention 
is drawn away.   
Managing for the unexpected also prepares an organization to take advantage of 
positive risk opportunities.  Readiness puts the organization in a position to exploit an 
opportunity first by being mindful of its existence and second to be prepared to exploit 
the opportunity once it presents itself.  In Chapter 4, the Astro Logistics project’s initial 
focus was on delivering functionality, not recognizing the secondary capabilities gained 
through superior reporting and management of the business.  
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High reliability organizations 
High Reliability Organizations are generally associated with organizations 
whom operate in highly hazardous environments that could cause catastrophic 
harm.  In Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe’s (2007) book, Managing the 
Unexpected, Resilient Performance in an Age of Uncertainty, their progressive 
research is based on: 
The examination of the way people and organizations organize for high 
performance in settings where the potential for error and disaster is 
overwhelming:  nuclear aircraft carriers, air traffic control systems, 
aircraft operations systems, hostage negotiation teams, emergency medical 
treatment teams, nuclear power generation plants, continuous processing 
firms, and wild land firefighting crews.” 36  
 
This knowledge area benefits from diversified professional disciplines 
conducting research based on their area of expertise.  Often initiated only after a 
major or near miss disaster, the accumulated diagnostic studies from the various 
disciplines both deepens and expands the breadth of expertise, generating synergy 
among them, to formulate a comprehensive synopsis of what caused the major 
disaster.  In the understanding of the contributing factors, precautionary response 
measures could be developed to avoid similar reoccurrence. 
In supporting the value of retrospective analysis, Christian Stadler (2011) studied 
the commonalities among the oldest sustaining companies with some histories dating 
back centuries.   In his book Enduring Success, What we can learn from the history of 
outstanding companies, he states:  
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Companies that perform outstandingly well over time act cautiously on many 
levels.  They know the future is uncertain and that they should never make 
assumptions that potentially threaten their existence.  In other words, they need to 
ensure that their core business is resilient enough to hold up against unexpected 
disasters. 37  
High reliability classification 
The use of “High” as a qualifier in the terminology of High Reliability 
Organization is consistently found in most research conducted on the topic.  This 
field of study also is also known as High Reliability Organization Theory or 
HROT.  This paper will prefer the use of High, versus “Absolute,” “Extreme” or 
“Perfect” or any synonyms which could be used to categorize near defect free 
operating performance.  The confines of existing research appears to be limited 
and oriented toward incidences capable of causing significant harm, such as 
within the parameters describe afore mention by Weick and Sutcliffe (2007). 
This paper postulates that the use of High does not anchor performance as 
perfection.  It allows extending latitude to scale, as within a tolerance of error, and 
scope where the boundaries are applicable to a larger population of organizations.  
This permits non HROs to benefit from the knowledge gained by both studying 
and understanding what makes HROs successful, and also applying it into their 
existing programs and organization.  This is supported by researchers in the high 
reliability theory area who argue “by analysis of high reliability organizations we 
can construct, discover and correct unexpected events that are capable of 
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escalation into serious problems and establish what is necessary for both reliable 
performance and adaptive learning.”38   Weick and Sutcliffe offer “Although 
HROs seem unlike any other organization, that appearance is deceptive.  They 
resemble other organizations in their input processes, their adoption of 
precautionary beliefs, and their susceptibility to surprises.  Where they differ is in 
their commitment to mindfulness as a means to manage inputs, precautions, and 
surprises.  Even though HROs may be unique in their pursuit of mindfulness, 
there is nothing unique about how they pursue it.  Processes by which HROs 
pursue mindfulness are processes that can be adopted by anyone.” 39 
Karelene H. Roberts (1990), one of the earlier published researchers and 
contributors on this subject, published an article titled “Managing High Reliability 
Organizations” in the California Management Review and describes HROs as:   
Within the set of hazardous organizations, some organizations have 
operated nearly error free for very long periods of time.  These 
organizations are “high reliability” organizations (HROs).  To identify 
these organizations one must ask the question, “How often could this 
organization have failed with dramatic consequences?”  If the answer to 
the question is many thousands of times the organization is highly reliable.  
In such organizations, performance reliability reveals productivity as a 
dominant goal.40  
There is considerable recent research derived from the medical domain.  
David Gaba (2005), in Improving Patient Safety by implementing strategies of 
High Reliability Organization Theory, addressed how High Reliability 
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Organization Theory (HROT) is applicable to perioperative health care, and has 
identified the following attributes when classifying HROs: 
Many of these industries share key features with health care that make 
them useful, if approximate models.  In these endeavors: 
• Intrinsic hazards are always present 
• Continuous operations 24 hours a day, seven days a week are 
the norm 
• There is extensive decentralization 
• Operations involve complex and dynamic work with complex 
materials 
• Multiple personnel from different backgrounds work together 
in complex units and teams.41 
 
The contention of this paper is that many of these items are relative in 
context and are applicable across a multitude of industries and disciplines.  In 
comparison to both scale and impact, a company bankrupted or that otherwise 
ceases to exist, creates undo trauma to its employees, their families, and the 
extended local community. 
 
Risk and uncertainty  
In David Hillson’s (2004) book Effective Opportunity Management for Projects, 
Exploiting Positive Risk, the author differentiates the term uncertainty from risk.  Where 
risk is referred to as aleatoric, whose root Latin word alea means dice.  Here, risk 
“strictly refers to an unknown event drawn from a known set of possible outcomes.”42   
He couples Risk, which is a measureable uncertainty, to Awareness.  Uncertainty is said 
to be Epistemic, with the Greek root word episteme which means knowledge.  Hillson 
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defines uncertainty as “an unknown event from an unknown set of possible outcomes”, 
which is due to a lack of knowledge about possible outcomes, their nature and associated 
probabilities.43   Hillson uses the following couplet to explain the relationship between 
risk and uncertainty, and distinguishes between aleatoric and epistemic as: Risk is 
measureable uncertainty; Uncertainty is unmeasurable risk.44 Hornbacher notes that 
uncertainty is an unknown event from an unknown set of possible outcomes, where 
sources are many, relates to “knowability” of what might happen in the future, with 
uncertainty being a fuzzy concept which needs focus to be practical.  45  
Figure 3 presents the relationship between awareness and knowledge in a four 
block matrix.  The model is similar to the JoHari Window concept that provides a 
perspective on personal awareness and blindness.  Starting in the top right quadrant, 
‘Certainty’ is your Known Knowns, where you know what you know; both awareness 
and knowledge are present.  Presence of both awareness and knowledge should be 
exploited to maximize your strengths and make full use of known facts to take well-
founded decisions and actions.46   
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Figure 3.  Knowledge and Awareness Matrix (Adapted from Hillson, 2004) 
 
 
The bottom right, in this situation you have the presence of knowledge, but you 
lack awareness or have a blind spot regarding the knowledge actually possessed.  This 
quadrant is labeled ‘Amnesia’.  Exposure unlocks the knowledge delivering advantage to 
the situation and the organization.  Exposure eliminates wasted opportunity that could 
otherwise been addressed with the existing resources, enabling better decision making 
and managing for the unexpected.  This will be a target area covered in the Chapter 4 
project study, where software development is supported by newly developed processes to 
convert signals into awareness, facilitating the ability to effectively deal with risk.  
The upper left is the Caution quadrant.  Here you have the presence of awareness, 
and recognize you lack specific information or experience in dealing with something.  
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You don’t have all the pieces, and recognize up-front they are missing or deficient in 
some form.  The appropriate response should be ‘explore’.  Realizing a shortfall gives 
you the opportunity to remedy the situation to satisfy the gap.  This is the only quadrant 
where risk in the sense defined above resides, whereas Risk is measurable uncertainty, 
allowing for quantitative analysis to be conducted on the range of possible outcomes.  
Pure ‘ignorance’ exists with the absence of awareness and knowledge. This is also 
referred to as an ‘unknown unknown”.  This is correctible through experience, 
competency development, training, and team composition and design.  PMI’s PMBOK® 
Guide-Fourth Edition offers guidance on this, stating “the specific unknown risks cannot 
be managed proactively, which suggests that the project team should create a contingency 
plan.”47   The existing dominant frameworks in project and program management do not 
explicitly recognize the distinct dual meaning of risk as described by Hillson above, nor 
develop the concept of awareness and knowledge in their guidelines.  Elaborating on this 
further, the OGC’s Managing Successful Programmes (MSP) states “Successful 
programme management has at its core the need to both manage and tolerate uncertainty, 
complexity and ambiguity.  Risk management and issue resolution are the vehicles for 
achieving this.”48   While the guideline establishes the need to develop a support structure 
and a supportive culture to realize the benefits of risk management, there is little evidence 
supporting the need to diagnose the program, project, or process aptitude for awareness 
and knowledge. Failure may result in a short coming to prepare for the unexpected and 
formulate the appropriate response.  In effect this jeopardizes the program allowing it to 
operate in a state of ignorance as categorized in Figure 3. 
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Introducing High Reliability Organization Theory (HROT) into the organization’s 
processes and culture accelerates awareness and knowledge –enabling an organization to 
effectively manage against the unexpected.  In Roberts and Bea’s (2001) article Must 
accidents happen? Lessons from high-reliability organizations, “Research on HROs 
shows that they are better finding out what they don’t know than are organizations that 
have higher accident frequencies.”49  Based on this finding, HRO’s operate at a high state 
of awareness by recognizing what they don’t know.  This drives them to remedy the gap, 
either by bringing in expertise, training, learning or gaining experience that enables them 
to perform with high reliability.  Since most organizations will operate in and out of the 
Caution and Amnesia quadrants, this conceptual framework promotes the need for 
continuous improvement to evaluate and develop the critical skill sets, knowledge, and 
competencies required by the organization to remain competitive, sustain itself, if not 
thrive in its business environment.  
Mindfulness 
Expectations create a reference baseline for both interpretation and 
judgment.   This frame of reference may cause bias as we look to reinforce what 
we anticipate will happen or how people will behave.  Expectations are built into 
nearly every component of our life.  In organization they are found in one’s roles 
and responsibilities, routines, deliverables and strategies.  Bias may cause 
erroneous diagnosis of the situation causing misdirected responses, or discounting 
aberrations resulting in failure to initiate a response.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) 
describe Lee Clarke’s findings in The Disqualification Heuristic: When Do 
Organizations Misperceive Risk? “the basic idea is that people disqualify 
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disconfirming information, highlight confirming information, and neglect 
information that contradicts a conviction, all in the interest of reducing 
uncertainty and increasing their sense of control.”50  
In Daniel Kahneman’s (2011) Thinking, Fast and Slow, he describes how 
one formulates a model of your personal world that represents what is normal in 
it. Kahneman notes, 
The model is constructed through associations that link ideas of 
circumstances, events, actions, and outcomes that co-occur with some 
regularity, either at the same time or within a relatively short interval.  As 
these links are formed and strengthened, the pattern of associated ideas 
come to represent the structure of events in your life, and it determines 
your interpretation of the present as well as your expectations of the 
future.51  
These heuristics aid in our ability to make rapid interpretations of 
situations, but also form a bias that may distort our sense of reality. 
Complex and dynamic processes may conceal confounding factors 
resulting in what may seem as benign signals that may exponentially worsen as 
they remain undetected.  These threats may cause tremendous stress and harm in 
the system when they surface at a later time making it much more difficult and 
costly to control.  Synder and Stukas (1999) identify that this expectation bias 
problem is accentuated under pressure.  Where pressure increases, people are 
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more likely to search for confirming information and to ignore information that is 
inconsistent with their expectations. 52  
Such situations create blind spots (Unknown Unknowns) that are only 
manageable by being tuned in to the details.  This heightened sense of awareness 
recognizes that expectations distort perception and operate in the moment, both 
seeking and engaging unexpected signals.  This is referred to as operating in state 
of Mindfulness.  Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) formally define mindfulness “a rich 
awareness of discriminatory detail”, with viewing mindfulness as being about the 
quality of attention, with a focus on comprehension of emerging threats and on 
factors that interfere with such comprehension.53  
Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) developed five principles that need to be 
indoctrinated into the organization to achieve High Reliability.  These include the 
ability to notice small failures (the principle of preoccupation with failure), and 
their distinctiveness must be retained rather than lost in a category (reluctance to 
simplify).  People need to remain aware of ongoing operations if they want to 
notice nuances that could be symptoms of failure (sensitivity to operations). 
Attention is also crucial for locating pathways to recovery (commitment to 
resilience) and the knowledge of how to implement those pathways (deference to 
expertise). 54  
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2005) five principles enable HROs to achieve 
reliability and effectively deal with the unexpected.  The first three deal with 
anticipation: Preoccupation with Failure, Reluctance to Simplify, and Sensitivity 
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to Operations. The last two deal with containment and include commitment to 
resilience, and deference to expertise.55   Collectively through a heightened sense 
of mindfulness within each area, they prepare an organization to work with the 
unexpected and to achieve reliability.  The below figure graphically demonstrates 
the relationship. 
Figure 4.  A Mindful Infrastructure for High Reliability (adapted from 
Weick et al., 1999, Willem, Eede, Bartel, 2007).56
 
Sensitivity to operations 
HRO mindfulness through sensitivity to operations is achieved through high 
situation awareness coupled with superior decision making capability; while operating in 
an environment with a great deal of uncertainty and incomplete information.  By 
understanding what makes an HRO successful, an organization has the potential to 
advance toward the ‘Certainty’ quadrant as presented in Figure 5.  The convergence of 
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HRO Theory with Project Risk Management principles demonstrates the synergistic 
opportunity to strengthen emerging best practices and theory in both domain areas. 
The downside of HROT is that through its emphasis on addressing weak 
signals with strong responses there may be instances where it is overkill. This 
may cause responses to activity that does not warrant attention, and worse yet, 
may be counter-productive by distracting one from addressing the issues that 
deserve greater attention.  The accumulation of weak signals may cause an over-
saturation of actionable items immobilizing the organization.  If not administered 
properly, this could paralyze an organization, in effect causing secondary risk that 
is greater than not addressing them in the first place.  Six Sigma uses the 
terminology common cause variation, to describe naturally occurring variation, 
for environmental factors beyond our control.  High Reliability Organization 
Theory’s orientation is to make strong responses to weak signals.  Here, common 
cause variation may not be discernible from special cause variation, which is 
correctible through process improvement tools and techniques, thereby resulting 
in wasted time, resources, and opportunity.  
Research to date on HROT offers little in the way of how to implement the 
finding of their research that curtails its value.  This capstone study indicates that 
this limitation may be offset by integrating HROT into mainstream frameworks, 
such as an Organizational Enabler in the OPM3 context.  HROT elevates an 
organization’s process and risk maturity growth through mindfulness attention to 
its five principle areas.  This process is thus facilitated by disseminating 
knowledge and developing cultural awareness on the importance of mindfulness. 
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Swiss cheese model 
James Reason, a sociologist from the University of California, Berkeley, 
and an early contributor on HROs, developed a conceptual model to identify how 
an accident can penetrate multiple barriers.  By analogy in Chapter 4’s Astro 
Logistics project, some of the traditional definitions of the elements are modified 
to reflect the characteristics of the study.  Each slice represents a defense barrier.  
The triggers are the risk signals against the process inputs, which are the tender 
orders from customers.  Where each sequential slice of cheese (shown as a disc in 
Figure 5) is a functional silo, the space between each slice represents the hand 
offs between the various groups involved in the process.  Traditionally, the holes 
represent the sub-optimal functioning within each area.  Extensions are made to 
include various signals, functional disruptions, and quality related concerns that 
may give way to problems in down steam production and service handling.  
Seemingly inconsequential signals in one process area, may either yield insight to 
another area or add value at a latter point of time. The project study develops the 
capability to capture these weak signals as Risk attributes against the order, 
fostering systemic visibility for determination and dynamic risk escalation 
handling.  Service failures occur when hazards penetrate the holes within the 
layers of the process, piercing multiple defense barriers to cause service failure.  
Use of this model provides a means to conceptualize the complexity of the 
process, and supports identifying the vulnerability of the organization.  The 
diagram demonstrates the value of each area being vigilant to the signals from 
within their immediate operating environment, and creating a heightened sense of 
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awareness of these concerns.  By being mindful of the sensitivity to operations, 
the organization can address early on signals with the appropriate response.  An 
escalation Responsibility, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed (RACI) matrix 
was developed in the Astro Logistics project to provide guidance for escalation 
communication management.  It was customized to incorporate severity against 
trigger points on when to take specific actions or formulate a team based 
response. 
Figure 5.  Swiss Cheese Model (adopted from James Reason HF model)57 
 
Another favorable attribute of this model is that it visualizes the gap between the 
functional areas.  This is similar to a Value Stream Map or other various process maps 
that utilize swim lanes to identify specific roles or functional areas.  Process management 
recognizes that the greatest risks to a process are in the handoffs or between the interfaces 
among the functional groups.  These are traditionally illustrated as delineated lines 
known as functional swim lanes in a process flow chart.  During these exchanges, 
communication issues, incongruent priorities per area, cultural issues and other 
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contributing variables introduce risk into the reliability of the service or product being 
delivered.  Rummler and Brache’s (2010) work in White Space Revisited, point out that 
the greatest opportunities for improved performance often turn up at the hand offs 
between silos also known as interfaces.  Each interface creates opportunities for 
important silo priorities to disrupt and delay processing work flowing through the silo on 
its way to some distant customer.58  
Christopher Martin and Donald Waters (2007), in the book Global Logistics, New 
Directions in Supply Chain Management, state. 
One of the most significant changes in recent years has been in the way in which 
we think of organization structures.  Conventionally, organizations have been 
'vertical' in their design.  In other words, businesses have organized around 
functions such as production, marketing, sales and distribution.  Each function has 
had clearly identified tasks and within these functional “silos” or “stovepipes” (as 
they have been called) there is a recognized hierarchy up which employees might 
hope to progress.  The problem with this approach is that it is both inwardly 
focused and concentrates primarily on the use of resources rather than upon the 
creation of outputs.  The outputs of any business can only be measured in terms of 
customer satisfaction achieved at a profit.  Paradoxically, these outputs can only 
be realized through coordination and cooperation horizontally across the 
organization.  These horizontal linkages mirror the materials and information flow 
that link the customer with the business and its suppliers.  They are in fact the 
core processes of the business.59  
 
Processes that are tightly aligned to the input and outputs of the customer 
facilitate tighter communication and promote amplification of the weak signals.  This 
enables well directed and prompt response handling.  Referring back to the Swiss Cheese 
Model, processes designed with strong horizontal linkages strengthen the defensive 
barriers among the functional handoffs. This improves its ability to manage the 
unexpected throughout its end to end process. 
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Process analysis  
While not specifically found in existing research on HROs, this Astro 
Logistics project study described in Chapter 4, utilized various process 
diagnostics tools including As Is, To Be, and Value Stream Mapping and codified 
the tasks into a modified Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).  A WBS 
decomposes processes into sub-processes, and breaks them down further into 
tasks at their lowest measurable level.  In the Astro Logistics project, modification 
was necessary to meet the customized needs of the client. Examples of the 
registered items included: upper/lower thresholds, how quality is measured, 
determining if the process works every time it is called upon, evaluating the root 
cause when it does fail, and assessing what needs to be measured to know if the 
system is operating properly.  Use of the WBS is described in both Chapter 4 and 
Appendix C: Process Analysis. 
Weak signal response 
HRO researchers are proponents of assertive action and effort against 
weak signals.  This is counter intuitive to how most people would behave.  
Normally one would respond to a strong signal with a strong response, and with a 
weak signal garnering a weak response.  Research by Weick and Sutcliffe 
identified, “HROs take deliberate steps to create more complete and nuanced 
pictures of what they face and who they are as they face it.  Knowing that the 
world they face is complex, unstable, unknowable, and unpredictable, HROs 
position themselves to see as much as possible.” 60  Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) 
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reference the work of psychologist James Reason on “latent failures”.  These are 
defined as “loopholes in the system’s defenses, barriers and safeguards whose 
potential existed for some time prior to the onset of the accident sequence though 
usually without any obvious bad effect.”61  These loop-holes consist of 
imperfections in the elements found in Figure 1: The Technical and Socio-
Cultural Dimensions of the Project Management Process.  These elements 
included both the science and art side components of a project. On the technical 
side, these may include project scope, WBS, Schedules, Resource Allocation, 
Baseline Budgets, and Status Reports.  On the Socio-cultural side, these may 
include Leadership, Problem Solving, Teamwork, Negotiation, Politics, and 
Customer Expectations.  These socio-cultural factors are the most inconsistent 
factors because they are people-based, and therefore harder to control their 
confounding effects, compared to the technical processes.  Roberts and Bea 
(2001) have identified three basic things HRO organizations do to enhance their 
reliability and offer helpful lessons to any organization seeking to increase its 
reliability: 
• HROs aggressively seek to know what they don’t know. 
• HROs design their reward and incentive systems to recognize costs 
of failures as well as benefits of reliability 
• HRO’s constantly communicate the big picture of what the 
organization seeks to do, and try to get everyone to communicate 
with each other about how they fit in the big picture.62   
 
Robert and Bea’s (2001) research identified that HROs spend 
disproportionately more money than other organizations training people to 
recognize and respond to anomalies.  Training includes both failure simulation 
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and accident analysis.  Simulation addresses anticipation of potential situations, 
and the latter builds an organization memory of what happened and why.  Such 
training helps people recognize how to decouple highly coupled systems quickly 
to minimize the harm caused by the initial accident to the total system. 63  
Roberts and Bea (2001) identify that HROs are able to balance producing 
short-run profits and the expense of long-term safety.  Their findings indicate that 
if reliability and safety are critical, it has to be measured, incentivized and 
rewarded or it won’t happen.” 64  Their position is that companies oriented only 
on financial performance run the risk of failure.  Some of the approaches they cite 
to address these issues are the following three items: 
1. Use interviews, focus groups, and employee surveys 
2. Develop creative accounting techniques to account fully for the 
cost of having accidents and assign value to avoiding them 
3. Develop and reward measures of safety and include them as part of 
employee evaluation to balance the financial measures. 65 
Communicating the big picture within an HRO enables its members to 
know how their behavior and action ties into the purpose of the organization.  It 
includes the importance of staying in touch with everyone if and when they see 
something wrong.  Key components include: 
• Top management tells stories about employees who saved the 
company major dollars, embarrassment, or injury; 
• All managers are encouraged and rewarded to communicate openly 
with each other, especially in situations that seem odd, unusual, or 
problematic; 
• Incident Command Systems are created as a standing procedure 
with well-know decision rules about when they are engaged. 66  
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In order to accomplish integration of HROT into project management, the 
process, tools, and technical applications need to be aligned and capable of 
converting weak signals into a form designed for early detection and prompt 
response handling.  Development of this capability engages the problems while 
they are manageable and controllable. This will be exemplified in the project 
study. 
Process coupling 
Adoption of any new theory, process, or procedure needs to add value to an 
organization.  Investment in time, resources, and capital must be substantiated by 
evidence that tangible results are achievable. This may be in the form of Risk Reward 
Benefit, Payback Financial Analysis, Return on Investment and from a multitude of 
various benefit realization measurements.  
In a continuous service operation, it is necessary to be sensitive to operations to 
pick up signals influencing the ability to deliver a quality product.  HROs both evaluate 
their failures and pay attention to their near misses.  For example, air traffic controllers 
must report near accidents.  The justification is that there are valuable lessons learned that 
can be used to openly discuss existing protocol to strengthen the process defenses in 
order to prevent re-occurrences and learn how to handle similar situations in the future. 
A major weakness in adopting HROT in one’s organization’s processes is the 
perception that one does not have the available resources, the time, or the technological 
capabilities to incorporate these process variables.  Organizations operating under Lean 
Six Sigma principles may also find this challenging.  Lean processes have the goal to 
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banish Muda, which is the Japanese term for waste and to minimize non-value steps.  
Waste may be made visible by mapping out the process steps and identifying the ones for 
which the customer is not willing to pay.  In this context, taking the time and effort to put 
strong responses into weak signals may result in change resistance. 
In Rummler, Ramias, Wilkins’s (2011) book Rediscovering Value Leading the 3-
D Enterprise to Sustainable Success, the authors define a process as “a construct for 
organizing value-adding work to achieve a business-valued milestone so it:  
Can be performed effectively and efficiently 
Can be managed effectively 
Offers the potential for a competitive advantage.  67 
The aforementioned criteria furnish an excellent triad for coupling comparison 
when assessing HROT.  Existing research limits itself through evaluating the tight 
coupling among HRO’s and efficiency.  Efficiency as a single element is ill suited to 
properly assess coupling, as a highly efficient project does not necessarily mean it’s 
effective.  In turn, a highly effective project may be so inefficient that it’s not viable to 
implement.  The Astro Logistics project shows how people, processes and technology can 
be integrated together to balance these competing variables into a project. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ASTRO LOGISTICS PROJECT 
Astro Logistics, a pseudo name for the actual company, provides 
transportation brokerage service in the United States market.   While it has been 
operating profitably for over 11 years, it has been struggling since November 
2010 with both internal and external challenges to its favorable growth.  Presently 
there are approximately ninety employees domiciled in a centralized location in 
the metro New Jersey/New York area.  As a transportation brokerage company, it 
operates as a middle man between shipper and motor carrier.  It does not own any 
truck assets.  Its success is dependent on finding trucks and having them pickup 
and deliver shipments on time.  The transportation sector is an intensely service 
oriented environment.  Astro’s customer base is very demanding with little 
tolerance for sub-standard performance. 
Astro Logistics’ growth aspirations were constrained by its ability to scale 
up its volume while sustaining if not improving its quality service level to its 
customers.  Diagnostic study of its end to end process identified the dependency 
on the shipment paperwork as a limiting factor.  Shipment paperwork was first 
generated when the shipment tender order was presented; it continued throughout 
its support processes across three separate departments and concluded once the 
load was delivered.  It served as a source document, accumulating additional 
pages, such as emails and screen printouts, to be used as an all encompassing 
reference document concerning the shipment.  The limiting factors include the 
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physical aspect that the paper could be in only one spot at any one time, often 
getting misplaced in the paper shuffle.  Frustration often occurred when a 
customer or carrier inquired about the status of a shipment, and the responder had 
difficulties hunting down the paperwork on someone’s desk to get an update. 
Sensitivity to operations 
A priority with top management was to eliminate being blind sided by the 
shipper calling in about a problem they were not aware of; usually a shipment was 
not delivered.  High profile shipments, such as high value or production 
deliveries, fall into this category. For example, Astro is constantly under pressure 
to deliver glass bottles to breweries around the country.  Many of these companies 
operate Lean or Just In Time (JIT) inventory practices.  In these scenarios the 
bottles are delivered to the brewery for immediate use in the assembly line.  
Failure to deliver the bottles jeopardizes the production operation by potentially 
causing the plant to shut down, resulting in stiff fines and penalties. 
Another important aspect, often emphasized by the organization’s 
management, is that it’s better to be in a position to make a call to a customer 
about a problem, than to unexpectedly receive a call from a customer regarding a 
problem the management knows nothing about.  The company needed a solution 
that provided visibility and transparency across the organization. 
HRO’s operate with a high sensitivity to operations as was described in 
previous chapters.  Integrating these principles into a comprehensive plan resulted 
in an end to end process definition. The tasks in the critical functional areas were 
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decomposed to a granular level within a work breakdown structure (WBS) 
template.  Each “As Is” step was catalogued, assessed, and analyzed.  While the 
“As Is” process was re-configured into a “To Be” process, risk assessment 
escalated from the task level to the organization and process level. 
Originally the steps were documented on Post It’s during working sessions 
with the Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).  Once organized, they were developed 
into a Visio diagram, reviewed by the business clients, and registered into an 
Excel spreadsheet.  The familiarity of Excel by the stakeholders made use of 
spreadsheets administratively easier during both elicitation and review sessions, 
and for distributing the outputs of such sessions to the group for their review.  The 
organization in the project study also used the process analysis to assist in job 
design definition, project prioritization, risk management, and to baseline 
throughput velocity and performance. 
Appendix C illustrates how each sub-process task is defined across an 
array of these performance variables.  Presence of these pre-defined performance 
variables facilitated brain storming which stimulated thought provoking 
discussion of the stakeholders.  It also channeled consideration of how the steps 
correspond to requirements within this and other downstream processes.  This 
included identification of the associated risk, constraints, inputs, outputs, and 
various other operating parameters.  In using Excel, it became relatively easy to 
aggregate sub-processes, under the hierarchy of their higher level processes, and 
to encapsulate the work flow into a comprehensive framework that supports 
systemic evaluation of the end to end process.   
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During this systemic evaluation, there needed to be a mechanism to filter 
weak but important signals from the noise.  This was deemed necessary to support 
scalability, and promote increased velocity, throughput, and service performance, 
in terms of on time delivery and exception management. 
The company internally developed a “Risk” dispatch status as both a 
searchable data element and visible icon to identify the orders deemed at jeopardy 
for late delivery. This functionality enabled the staff to register the signals from 
within its immediate operating environment and associated them to the orders 
deemed at risk.  This supported the ability to have greater sensitivity to its 
operations. 
Development of the Risk status supplemented the conventional use of 
qualifiers based on the characteristics of the cargo or trailer requirement, Hot 
Load (e.g. a production load), contract and insurance status, among others.  These 
statuses were also developed into search criteria to filter on specific loads, 
prioritize work, and manage the shipment in the system.  For example, now at his 
finger tips, a dispatch manager could search on all the loads the organization 
deemed to be at risk or in need of special attention.  Visibility gave the dispatch 
manager the ability to verify that the appropriate responses were being taken.  
Greater visibility also increased the level of cross functional team problem 
solving and collaboration. 
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Application development 
Development of the risk status enabled users to encapsulate their tacit 
knowledge and risk assessment based on their functional area.  Combined with 
online search filters and reporting capabilities, it created a dynamic and 
interactive risk register broken down to the single shipment level, which supports 
HRO’s need to be sensitive to operations.  Given this was a novel approach 
without precedent in the organization, the risk designation criteria were 
intentionally not defined, leaving it to the collective organization to normalize 
how they wished to exploit this technology.  Intentions were to avoid a situation 
that delegated away responsibility from the individual level and retained the 
initiative of the employee.  During implementation training, each employee was 
oriented to the critical roles they each play and the shared responsibility they have 
in the successful delivery of every load.  By each position taking ownership and 
contributing their risk awareness in the form of preparedness to the unexpected, in 
effect problems were prevented from occurring. 
An extension of enabling the Risk Icon is the ability to add order notes 
which further enriches the quality of the aggregated risk assessments.  For 
example, the customer service representatives are on the front end, processing the 
order when it comes in, and setting the pickup and delivery appointments.  When 
dealing directly with the shippers and consignees, the communication exchange 
might reveal potential problems.  An example may be a warehouse backed up.  
This may be a signal that changing an appointment there may encounter a 
problem if the carrier experienced a delay.  A carrier held up at a shipper, 
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jeopardizes not only his on time delivery, but subsequent loads due to federally 
mandated hour of service regulation  Sensitivity to operations is achieved by 
registering these weak signals as risk attributes in the system against the specific 
order.  This facilitates proactive problem solving and resiliency that are also key 
aspects of HROs. 
Harvey A. Levine (2005), in his book Project Portfolio Management: A 
Practical Guide to Selecting Projects, Managing Portfolios, and Maximizing 
Benefits, advises that dealing with projects with High Uncertainty, through their 
very nature is to exhibit increased uncertainty in the earlier phases.  Levine states 
“the objective of the earlier phases is to define the later ones.  As the project 
moves through the phases, the degree of uncertainty should diminish.” 68   Similar 
to the Astro Logistics project, identifying the warning signals early on offers the 
organization the ability to assess their risk at key stages or milestones within the 
shipments activity.  Risk response triggers are deployed based on pre-set criteria 
as defined in the RACI escalation matrix. 
Supporting this approach, Roberts and Bea (2001) advise,  
While the importance of communication may seem self-evident to most 
managers, HROs truly emphasize it. They spend time and money 
developing and maintaining an effective communication capability that 
allows them to shape and share the big picture of what the organization 
should be looking for and worrying about as they do their jobs. 69  
Correspondingly, the brokerage group deals directly with motor carriers 
and continuously receives feedback from the carriers.  This is a valuable conduit 
for external signals, as well as to be in a position to flag credibility issues with 
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particular carriers or other red herring issues that jeopardize performance on a 
given load.  
Dispatch is the execution phase of the process, from carrier set up, to 
driver dispatch, tracking, and tracing of the moves.  This group manages the 
shipments from pick up coordination to final delivery.  Development of the 
system included search and sort functionality to prioritize the work, which also 
included ability to segregate and identify all the flagged Risk orders.  Priority 
management and escalation handling permitted greater focus on issues which 
poised the greatest risk.   
Performance 
Approximately 3 months have elapsed since implementation.  The most 
demanding accounts, many being the well known big box retailers, have 
experienced a10  percent or more increase in On Time Delivery (OTD).  It is not 
uncommon to have subsequent week-to- week on time delivery performance 
scores at 100%.  Prior to the implementation, operating at such levels was never 
accomplished.  Phone metrics measured by the number of dropped calls improved 
by over 20 percentage points.  Prior to implementation, Astro’s dispatch 
department was operating near 70%.  This equates to 30% of their inbound phone 
calls dropping off.    Within 60 days the company was operating in the low 
nineties.  Evidence of adopting HROT mindfully (recognition of sensitivity to 
operations) strongly suggests it drives success. In this case, it delivered the ability 
to turn a liability into a competitive advantage. 
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One of the concrete improvements in the new process includes 
development of the Risk icon and its supporting functionality.  This delivers the 
ability to pick up the “noise” across the silos.  These noises are equivalent to the 
weak signals of complexity that may reside as tactical knowledge within one 
domain, but not explicitly known or understood by the other functional areas.  
The cumulative effect of the other functional areas’ expertise, especially as fresh 
signals occur, adds value to the assessment and the tactical response handling.  
Based on improved performance, customers have awarded Astro additional 
business supporting the sustainability of their business model. 
Continuous process improvement 
Karl E. Weick’s and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe’s (2007) research on High 
Reliable Organizations (HRO’s), they identified that organizations must maintain 
continuing alertness to the unexpected in the face of pressure to take cognitive 
shortcuts.  Shortcuts stem from prior success, simplifications, strategies, plans and 
use of hierarchy to pass responsibility upward.  Brutal audits lie in the path of 
those same shortcuts. 70    The extra work spent up-front, as demonstrated in the 
Astro Logistics project, contributes to the building of core competency and 
achieving the company’s goals. 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) continued by saying HROs are distinguished 
from other types of organizations. 
They are attentive to the front line, where the real work gets done.  The 
“big picture’ in HROs is less strategic and situational than is true of most 
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other organizations.  When people have -developed situational awareness, 
they can make the continuous adjustments that prevent errors from 
accumulating and enlarging.  Anomalies are notices while they are still 
tractable and can still be isolated. All this is made possible because HROs 
are aware of the close tie between sensitivity to operations and sensitivity 
to relationships. 71  
Escalation, control, and customer feedback 
Further supporting the keen attention to operations, a customized 
Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed (RACI) matrix and 
communication escalation protocol was implemented.  This cross reference matrix 
defined responsibility against actionable trigger points to escalate the situation or 
take specific action.  This one page form was a means for the CEO to exercise his 
risk tolerance against typical operational scenarios and to leave no room for 
interpretation.  These guidelines remove any ambiguities regarding responsibility 
and ownership.  Development in itself delved into the sensitivity of operations, of 
who is accountable, responsible, and consulted prior making a decision or 
communicating to the customer. Historically many of these situations were 
handled in functional isolation.  They now permeate horizontally across silos, 
vertically to management, and frequently cross departmental lines.  This better 
leverages the expertise of the organization on a whole to better assess and 
effectively work through a problem.  It also improves communication with the 
customer.  For example, the Sales group has now become much more informed of 
operational issues.  This enables them to proactively communicate to their 
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contacts and leverage their relationship to develop the most amicable solutions. 
Customer service is now better informed on carrier issues and challenges.  This 
improves their effectiveness in dealing with shippers, consignees, customer load 
planners, transportation, and corporate management.  This facilitates an 
understanding of the big picture, that was identified earlier as another quality of 
HROs. 
The RACI escalation matrix was presented to select customers to solicit 
their feedback and to customize our escalation and communication protocols to 
satisfy their expectations.  Favorable feedback was received.  Appendix B: RACI 
illustrates an example. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Capstone is to determine if incorporating High Reliability 
Theory (HROT) -mindfulness of the unexpected through sensitivity to operations into 
project and program management- may improve the success in fulfilling the 
organization’s goals.  The business case is predicated on the need for improvement.  
Approximately only one third of projects succeed, as documented in the 2008 Standish 
report on IT projects.  Research also identified that less than 10% of companies are 
operating at CCM maturity level of 4 or 5.  This gap means these organizations are not 
operating with fully managed and continuously improving processes.  HROs are 
organizations that operate continuously and whose failure would cause serious harm.  
These organizations have been well studied by professionals from numerous disciplines.  
These studies offer excellent insight on what makes an HRO successful and may be 
applied to non HROs. 
In Chapter 2, the Literature Review identified High Reliability Organizations as 
an emerging theory area.  Currently HROT has little recognition in main stream project, 
process, or program frameworks.  A critical argument against HROT research is that it is 
based on a narrow cohort study which operates under very different operating parameters 
from main stream organizations.  HROT is viewed as tightly coupled with efficiency, and 
critics may claim it is not viable for mainstream organizations that must work under 
tighter resource and budgetary constraints than HROs.  
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Chapter 3 demonstrated that projects processes operate in two dimensions; 
Technical- which includes the hard science of project management, and the Socio-
Cultural- which includes the “art” side of organizational dynamics.  Operating under 
HROT’s sense of Mindfulness and its five principles of Preoccupation with Failure, 
Reluctance to Simplify, Sensitivity to Operations, Commitment to Resilience, and 
Deference to Expertise delivers the proper orientation to bridge the two project process 
dimensions.  Mindful anticipation and containment deliver the capability to manage for 
unexpected events and achieve high reliability.  While each of the five principles is 
important, this capstone emphasized Sensitivity to Operations and illustrated its value in 
the Astro Logistics Project. 
This capstone identifies the potential for HROT to be integrated into mainstream 
frameworks and deliver value.  Based on the literature review and augmented by direct 
experience from the Astro Logistics Project, HROT appears to be a natural fit as an 
organizational enabler within the OPM3® framework.  Implementing HROT as a 
contributing factor in OPM3® best practices would be likely to increase the 
organization’s maturity and favorably impact the strategic inputs and outputs at the 
portfolio, program and project level.  Chapter 3 also identified similar advantages in other 
well known frameworks such as the Capability Maturity Model and Risk Maturity Model 
where it is recognized as a maturity accelerator.  
Chapter 4 validated the capstone’s research by comparing it with an actual 
process and IT development project.  The project describes how inclusion of 
HROT principles into a new paperless dispatch process yielded favorable results.  
The Astro Logistics project demonstrates how HRO theory can be integrated into 
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business process management, effectively integrate risk management into an 
operating plan, and foster a culture of risk awareness and mindfulness of the 
unexpected.  Coupling both process and IT development proved critical to 
dynamically register the risk signals for collaboration across functional silos. 
Adoption of this systemic approach better equipped the organization with a tool to 
prioritize response efforts against the multitude of signals encountered throughout 
an orders life cycle.  Ultimately this has proven to improve the reliability of the 
organization as substantiated through higher key performance scores. 
While the HRO theory provides invaluable insight into the contributing 
factors of success or failure of HROs, there is very limited research available on 
how best to implement it. This business case demonstrates that HROT is very well 
suited to be incorporated into existing project management methods with a high 
degree of success.  
 Future research is recommended in three areas.  The first is to correlate the 
association of Organization Maturity with HROs. Second, utilize economic modeling to 
present implementation merits from a financial perspective and third, evaluate the 
viability of converting the retrospective findings into a consolidated body of knowledge 
that may be used in a prospective framework. 
 Other potential future applications may include developing a High Reliability 
‘Partnership’ model.  This construct would emblaze the five success criteria of an HRO 
into guiding principles for the relationship.  Adopting HROT into supply chain 
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collaboration benefits both parties and develops maximum synergy among the 
partnership enabling competitive advantage.   
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APPENDIX A 
WEB PAGE 
“Risk” was designated as a Dispatch Status making it available as a Search 
filter and viewable in both the Order screen as an Exclamation Mark and as a 
Caution symbol in the Dispatch Status (DS) column.  Used in conjunction 
with notes, the signals could be monitored and a response triggered under the 
criteria defined in the escalation matrix. 
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APPENDIX B 
RACI 
 
This Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed (RACI) matrix was 
developed to establish threshold guidelines for response handling and achieve 
clarity in roles and responsibilities.  Management categorized the Escalation 
Level per each Issue and approved the Ownership.  It was developed both as a 
bottom up and top down exercise to secure buy in and establish credibility in the 
criteria. 
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APPENDIX C 
PROCESS ANALYSIS 
Enclosed is the process definition for Accounts Receivable and Payable process, 
which is downstream function of the order process. The full end to end analysis was 
conducted to identify the inter-relationships, complexity and risk in the decision making 
process. Beyond routine process definition, this modified Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) tool was also configured to support job design and tact time calculation. 
(Partially Adopted from Rummler, Ramias, Rummler (2010) White Space 
Revisited, Figure 6.3 The VCH and Key Variables Requirement) 
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